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In 2013, 73 percent of the population of the European Union used the 
internet. And the number of users is still going up. In the run up to the 
European elections, we are led to ask a number of crucial questions: 
How do anti-European populists market themselves on the internet? 
Are they opinion leaders of the web community? Turns out they're not. 
The Pro-Europeans are strong. We'll explain why and what to do to make 
them even stronger. 
A growing number of people are beginning to re-
ject traditional voting patterns and to decide at 
short notice which party they are going to vote 
for. As a result two factors are becoming increas-
ingly important: The final leg of the campaign 
and the location where it takes place. Simultane-
ously the internet is gaining in importance as a 
source of information. If we assume that populist 
parties and movements have restricted access 
to the traditional media, we will perhaps come 
to the conclusion that they are making greater 
use of the internet in order to get their message 
across. Is that correct? And does their hatred of 
the common enemy actually motivate them to 
team up and to set up links, both at home and 
with people in other countries? What role do 
they play in “national” debates that are conduct-
ed online? Is this a place where they are of cen-
tral importance, something that is not the case 
in the traditional media? And is that the reason 
why they are opinion leaders?
In order to come up with some answers to these 
questions we devised a kind of internet mag-
netic resonance tomography or MRT. These 
charts show us things that are normally invis-
ible, namely that part of the internet which dis-
seminates populist and anti-European content, 
and the level of interaction between the vari-
ous websites, blogs, forums, etc. By measuring 
and visualizing their connections and interac-
tion, we can begin to understand who is talking 
to whom, who is spurring on the debate, and 
the isolation or integration of the various ac-
tors. We have analyzed German, French, Brit-
ish, Dutch, Italian and Polish networks. And for 
purposes of comparison we have also examined 
pro-European networks in Germany and France.
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 » In France the Front National (FN)  is the 
most important anti-European actor. But there 
are also people in public life who personify 
 anti-European attitudes and are very visible 
both online and offline. However, they never 
allude to the FN or to one of its representatives, 
and in other ways are not close to the FN in 
political terms.
 » In Germany the European policy network 
(both for and against) is not as dense as in the 
other states included in this study. However, 
it is more closely linked with those of its Eu-
ropean neighbours than the other networks. 
For this reason it is of central importance in 
the European debate. The pro-Europeans are 
clearly in the majority, whereas the anti-Euro-
peans are weak and isolated. The Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD) however has surprising-
ly close links with the German online media 
landscape.
 » The Italian network is very fragmented. 
Beppe Grillo and his Five Star Movement form 
the largest network. Thus at least 1.44 million 
people follow Beppe Grillo’s comments on 
Twitter. However, there are no links to other 
political actors.
 » In the Netherlands quite a few parties fight 
for eurocritical positions. Civil society is absent 
though in this network. So are online media.
 » The most active anti-European actor in the 
Polish internet is Nowa Prawica, the Congress 
of the New Right. Nowa Prawica is a party that 
was founded in 2011 as a result of the amalga-
mation of two far-right parties. It is noticeable 
that it has close links with Ruch Narodowy, a 
radical right-wing party.
 » In contrast to the anti-Europeans the pro-
Europeans can conduct debates in a transna-
tional open space. There is a pan-European 
public sphere on the internet. This may not be 
as large as the national public spheres, but it 
exists. However, the European policy network 
is dominated by political parties and institu-
tions. Civil society continues to be rather weak.
When we look at the charts, it is important to 
remember that they are not about left or right, 
or north and south. The basic idea is the con-
cept of centrality. In a network the latter has 
a bearing on the number of links, the level 
of activity, and the extent of its influence. At 
the start of our investigation we identified 
20 websites in every country which dissemi-
nate populist and anti-European content. We 
came to the conclusion that three criteria are of 
crucial importance: attitudes to the  European 
Union, attitudes to the euro, and attitudes to 
the Schengen Agreement.
All in all we looked at 1,638 websites. Of these 
988 are eurosceptical. However, they are dis-
tributed across the six countries covered by 
the survey, whereas the 650 which are in fa-
vour of integration were found in the German-
speaking and French-speaking nets.
We have tried to use terminology in a consist-
ent way. Anyone who writes about this subject 
quickly comes up against the problem of how to 
define certain things and ideas. Making subtle 
distinctions between anti-European, europhobic, 
eurosceptic and eurocritical is rather laborious 
and reader-unfriendly, and in our context does 
not get us very far. The crucial feature as far as 
we are concerned is whether a discourse is con-
ducted in a constructive or a destructive manner. 
Those who are looking for solutions within the 
EU are being constructive. Those who want to 
get rid of the euro, to get rid of the Schengen 
Agreement and/or to get rid of the EU itself are 
certainly not being very constructive.
Principal results
 » Despite public announcements about pro-
posals for cooperation, there are hardly any 
links between the anti-European movements in 
the countries covered in the survey.
 » In the final analysis the anti-European par-
ties also keep themselves to themselves with-
in the nation-states. It is true that they have 
their own networks, but these are largely iso-
lated. The big exception is the United Kingdom 
 Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain.
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European Networks
Europe’s virtual public sphere is just as frag-
mented in linguistic and national terms as the 
traditional one. This is especially true of the 
networks of the populist parties. Whilst it is 
a fact that their well-known leaders have kept 
themselves in the news in recent months by 
travelling around, meeting various people, 
and making proposals for cooperation, our 
charts show that there is no interaction what-
soever and no links between the parties. It is 
true that we have been able to identify a total 
of 988 eurosceptical websites in the countries 
included in this study, but on all of the 988 
we could find only four links. The Italian ac-
tivist website bastaeuro.it refers once to the 
French Front National and once to the Dutch 
Partij voor de  Vrijheid (Party for Freedom). 
And the British UKIP is twice cited on 
French debating websites (La lettre volée and 
Decap’actu. The first is a blog, and the second 
a news website). There is also no such thing 
as a pan-European network of anti-European 
populists on the internet. There is no central 
marketplace or workshop for ideas. It is per-
haps even more surprising to discover that the 
movements are very isolated, not only on the 
European stage, but also within their national 
borders. Even parties such as the French Front 
National which have been in existence for a 
long time, and the representatives of which 
have advanced in their countries to become 
europhobia opinion leaders, have not been re-
warded with links and interconnectedness. It 
may well be true that 23 percent of the young 
people in France could see themselves vote for 
the FN, and that Marine Le Pen regularly ap-
pears on radio and television shows, but that 
does not mean that people refer to her on po-
litical internet websites in France, that she is 
at the forefront of the online debate, or that 
the websites of her party or those of her rep-
resentatives and sympathizers are linked with 
other organizations.
The pro-European network is not only numeri-
cally stronger (658 as opposed to 251 in France 
and Germany). It is also very much intercon-
nected. This shows not only that the links ex-
ist, but also that there is interaction between 
the pro-Europeans. They form a  Europe-wide 
network in which they trade ideas, opinions, 
concepts and information, and thus, even if 
Source: linkfluence
1,638 European political websites 
In Germany and France, with pro- and anti-European content; 
in the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland with anti-European content 
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
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want to find out more about European politics 
on the internet. The level of interconnected-
ness and the degree of exchange has an impor-
tant influence on the status that is accorded 
to the websites by the various search engines, 
and thus enhances their visibility and acces-
sibility in a very significant way.
these are aligned along traditional lines of 
conflict, they are forging a shared vision and 
a common philosophy. The charts show very 
clearly that there is a lively European public 
sphere on the internet. That is a decisive fac-
tor, not only for those who are already partici-
pants in this network, but also for those who 
988 websites with anti-European content 
In Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
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National Networks
Germany – 80% integration friendly
Germany may be the largest country in the Eu-
ropean Union, but its political network is rela-
tively weak. A mere 349 websites are devoted 
to European policy content. Compare this with 
France, which, although it has fewer internet 
users, has a total of 573 websites. The political 
parties are very well represented in this line-
up. To all intents and purposes the European 
policy network clusters around party websites 
and those of their deputies. Thus, as might 
have been expected, the network of the pro-
Europeans is rather strong. They operate 276 
out of 349 websites, which means that about 
80 percent of all internet websites have inte-
gration-friendly views. Only 73 websites in Ger-
many disseminate content that is opposed to in-
tegration. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
has the strongest anti-integration network, and 
the Nationale Partei Deutschland (NPD) has the 
second strongest. However, the NPD network, 
unlike that of the AfD, is largely isolated. It lies 
isolated on the upper right edge of the chart. 
The AfD lies slightly lower, and also on the 
right edge, but it is not as isolated.  It has sur-
prisingly close links with the German online 
media landscape. No other party and indeed no 
other institution achieves such a high degree 
of interconnectedness with German media web-
sites or lies so close to them on our chart as the 
AfD. The websites of the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ) play such an important role that 
on our chart they come up as an integral part 
of the eurocritical network. Every reader will 
have noticed that since the outbreak of the debt 
crisis AfD party members and sympathizers 
have made particularly intensive use of the on-
line media comment columns and that it is also 
not a secret that faz.net, which for weeks gave 
its special sections on the euro crisis the title 
“Moving towards the Transfer Union,” became 
the publisher of choice for professors who were 
critical of the financial rescue policies and like-
minded individuals. Go to Google and type in 
“Professors oppose euro faz.net,” and you will 
get an impression of just how many articles 
there are, and of the prevailing mood. The fact 
that AfD supporters and sympathizers first got 
to know each other and to organize themselves 
through media comment columns may perhaps 
explain their almost total absence from Twitter. 
Party leader and poster boy Bernd Lucke gave 
up using Twitter completely after the elections 
Source: linkfluence
Germany
349 websites with pro- and anti-European content
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
AfD
6
sp
ot
lig
ht
 e
ur
op
e 
# 
20
14
 / 0
2 
  The 
Po
pu
lis
t N
et
w
or
ks
public eye in recent years. On the one hand 
there is strong language. On the other hand 
there are the CSU’s party manifestos and po-
litical action, and in this context such heckling 
seems less important. Thus we cannot describe 
the CSU as an anti-European party. It has not 
called for the abolition of the euro, or for the 
abrogation of the Schengen Agreement. Nor 
does it want to dismantle the EU. However, it 
continues to play an ambiguous role. Its repre-
sentatives are often loud and brash, and do not 
mince their words, and this tends in particular 
to shock European observers, who find it dif-
ficult to assess the precise meaning of their re-
marks in the context of German politics.
The absence of civil society in the public sphere 
of the German internet is truly dramatic. No 
more than 5.4 percent of the identified web-
sites are operated by associations, networks or 
other civil society groups. If one decides to in-
clude the media websites, one arrives at 23 per-
cent. This means that 77 percent of the  German 
internet devoted to European policy is in the 
hands of political parties, party representatives, 
and large institutions.
to the German Parliament. His last tweet was 
on 23 September 2013. At that point he was 
being followed by 4,314 readers. His party col-
leagues Frauke Petry, Hans-Olaf Henkel and 
Beatrix von Storch are being followed by no 
more than 894, 817 and 589 people who are 
curious to know what they have to say. In the 
European context this is next to nothing. The 
Twitter list of the most prominent German eu-
rocritics starts off with the former FDP mem-
ber of the German Parliament, Frank Schäffler. 
He is being followed by 8,051 readers. But in 
Italy Beppe Grillo sends his brief messages to 
1.44 million people, in the Netherlands Geert 
 Wilders reaches 323,000 people, in France Ma-
rine Le Pen has 280,000 followers, and in the 
United Kingdom Nigel Farage has 121,000.
In the German European policy debate the CSU 
often plays a somewhat confusing role of its 
own, and this, especially for non-German ob-
servers, is rather difficult to decipher. On our 
chart its websites and those of its representa-
tives are not deemed to be part of the eurocriti-
cal network. This may seem surprising when 
one thinks of the kind of commentary which 
has enabled Markus Söder, Alexander Dobrindt 
and Peter Gauweiler to keep themselves in the 
Source: linkfluence
Germany
73 websites with anti-European content
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
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France – Le Pen is not alone
When it comes to politics, the French are more 
active on the internet than their German neigh-
bours. We identified a  total of 573 websites 
which play a role in the European policy debate. 
But there are not only more websites in pure-
ly quantitative terms. They are also far more 
closely linked. Whereas on the German chart it 
is still easy to see individual links, the links be-
tween the French websites weave a dense web. 
There are 178 anti-European websites, and they 
are all located on the top edge of the chart. The 
network of the Front National (FN) is rather 
large, but is located in a somewhat isolated po-
sition at the top right of the chart. The small 
anti-European parties Mouvement républicain et 
citoyen (MRC) and Debout la République are far 
better integrated. 
The MRC is left-wing nationalist party which has 
called on the electorate to boycott the elections 
to the European Parliament. It was founded 
by the venerable French politician Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement. For many years Chevènement 
was a minister in various Socialist governments, 
and one of the comrades-in-arms of François 
Mitterrand, with whom he founded the Parti 
Socialiste (PS). To this day he is a senator in the 
upper house of the French parliament. Thus he 
is a typical example of a very French phenom-
enon. A renegade ex-minister who now has his 
own small party to back him up, and is a famil-
iar public figure with a great love for the “val-
ues of the republic,” which he or she considers 
to be irreconcilable with European integration. 
This kind of rejection of the EU can go hand in 
hand with left-wing or right-wing positions. But 
all these people share a nostalgia for the France 
of General de Gaulle. Christine Boutin – now 
Force Vie, formerly Union pour un  Mouvement 
Populaire (UMP) – is one of them, and so is 
Nicolas Dupont-Aignan – now Debout de la 
République, formerly UMP. They are both very 
active on Twitter and have 63,500 and 58,600 
followers. Critics such as Laurent Wauquiez and 
Henri Guaino (both UMP) or Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
(Front de Gauche) have even deeper roots in tra-
ditional parties. Wauquiez, who was Minister for 
European Affairs under Sarkozy, recently broke 
with the positions held by his party in a book 
entitled “Europe : il faut tout changer” (Europe. 
Everything must be changed). He would like to 
go back to the Europe of the six founding states, 
though he would try to replace Luxembourg 
with Spain, since Luxembourg is “a tax haven.” 
Source: linkfluence
France 
573 websites with pro-and anti-European content
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
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Wauquiez has a Twitter account which goes back 
to his time as a minister, and 130,000 followers. 
And he also has a website which has numerous 
visitors. And then there is MEP Jean-Luc Mélen-
chon, who, when is all is said and done, was able 
to attract the support of eleven percent of the 
electorate at the last presidential elections. He 
is both famous and notorious for his hard-hitting 
statements, and not so long ago he said on the 
France 3 television channel: “The question is 
not whether France will have to leave the euro, 
but when and how that will happen.” In France 
202,000 people read Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s news 
on Twitter. He makes regular appearances in all 
the media, and no one will bat an eyelid if one 
cites something that he has said. In the final 
analysis this European election campaign has re-
opened old wounds, and it harks back to the dis-
agreements that surfaced in France during the 
Constitutional referendum and the Maastricht 
referendum. At the time the rift was apparent in 
all of the political parties. In this campaign only 
the Parti socialiste has remained calm.
On our chart Laurent Wauquiez and Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon are not as yet part of the anti-Euro-
pean network. They have only recently changed 
their positions, and it is not yet clear whether 
they have simply succumbed to election fever, or 
whether they will actually move on to some kind 
of political action.
Thus the success of Marine Le Pen is obvious. 
However, there is also her network, which is gen-
erally perceived to be dangerous. It continues to 
be isolated. She has not as yet managed to over-
come the mistrust and condemnation that accu-
mulated under her father. Throwing in one’s lot 
with Marine Le Pen and the FN is still a systemic 
risk. It is not as dangerous to cite Chevènement, 
Boutin or Dupont-Aignan, and there does not 
seem to any risk whatsoever when it comes to 
Wauquiez and Mélenchon.
In contrast to other countries an anti-European 
stance is not a unique feature of one particular 
individual or of one political party. It is of course 
true that the vast majority of the members of the 
large parties in France is pro-European. This is 
also demonstrated by our charts. 67 percent of 
the websites are integration-friendly, and they 
are also in the centre of the chart, which means 
that they are central to the debate. Nevertheless 
there are a number of people (from a variety of 
political backgrounds) who have quite openly 
adopted eurosceptical positions.
Source: linkfluence
Germany
73 websites with anti-European content
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
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United Kingdom – UKIP’s everywhere
In England we scrutinized only the network 
of the eurocritics. Two things are especially 
noteworthy. The United Kingdom is the only 
country in which a traditional party is openly 
anti-European. However, the Conservatives (or 
Tories) are neither central to the internet debate, 
nor are they the opinion leaders. Their main 
weapon is their network, which is relatively iso-
lated on the upper left edge of the chart. Only 
 conservatives.com is still in touch with the cen-
tre. The real leader of the anti-European debate 
in Britain is the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP). It is the only anti-integration par-
ty in our study that has managed to become an 
integral part of the mainstream. It is not only 
at the centre of the British debate. It also leads 
it. Anyone looking for information on or opin-
ions about European integration in the British 
internet will end up with the UKIP. It has its 
own network, which is the largest and the one 
with the best links. And it also has links with 
all the other important actors. Whereas the 
various anti-European parties in the countries 
covered by this study do not on the whole keep 
in touch with their political rivals, the UKIP 
does at least have some  rather basic links with 
the Tories, the far-right British National Party, 
and the English Democrats. It is even in touch 
with left-wing anti-European parties such as 
the Socialists and the Communists. However, it 
is even more significant that it has close links 
with the media, analysts, societies and associa-
tions, and this means that an active section of 
civil society shares the ideas of the UKIP and 
openly disseminates them on the internet. This 
interconnectedness is the reason for their cen-
tral position, and it is the crucial difference 
between what is happening in Britain and the 
other countries. Compare this with Marine Le 
Pen, who disseminates her anti-European views 
in a very visible manner. Moreover, her party 
plays an important role. But she is not the only 
politician of her kind in France, and certainly 
not the central point of reference. Nigel Farage 
and the UKIP are not the only ones either, but 
they are the central figures among British op-
ponents of Europe.
All in all we were able to identify 235 websites 
on the British internet that were against inte-
gration. That is about 25 percent more than 
in France and almost 70 percent more than in 
Germany. Of the 235 websites 173 are party 
websites, and 62 are websites operated by the 
Source: linkfluence
Great Britain
235  websites with anti-European content 
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
United Kingdom 
Independence Party
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media and civil society, including websites such 
as eureferendum.com,  freenations.freeuk.com 
and openeurope.org.uk. It does not come as 
much of a surprise that the websites of the 
 Telegraph and the Sun are part of the insular 
anti-European network.
The Netherlands – civil society’s absent
In the Netherlands we studied only the anti-
European network. It is immediately appar-
ent that the Dutch eurocritics are fragmented. 
They are located at the edge of the chart. The 
centre remains empty. Of the 134 websites 
that were identified, more than 90 percent 
can be assigned to political parties. There 
are hardly any websites operated by the tra-
ditional media, blogs, forums, associations or 
other civil society initiatives. The Partij voor 
de Vrijheid (PVV) is visible at the right upper 
edge of the chart. It has the largest network, 
but is otherwise very isolated. As was to be 
expected with a one-man party, the network 
revolves around the websites of the Freedom 
Party itself and the personal websites of Geert 
Wilders, its founder, head and only real repre-
sentative. Geert Wilders has 323,000 followers 
on Twitter. When all is said and done, that 
means that he has direct access to two percent 
of the population of the Netherlands.
It is noticeable that many parties in the Nether-
lands hold anti-European views. Most of them 
are small parties which can get no more than 
a few seats in the Dutch parliament. But they 
come from all parts of the political spectrum. 
On the left of the spectrum are the Socialists, 
SP, and the Greens, GroenLinks. On the right of 
the spectrum are the conservative ChristenUnie 
and the SGP. These two parties are actually very 
close to each other on the chart. They maintain 
close links and are also nearest to the centre 
of the chart, even though they do not occupy it.
Italy – Against Rome, Berlin, Brussels
In the case of Italy we singled out only the pop-
ulists who are opposed to European integration. 
In the process we identified three actors: the 
old-established inhabitants, the opportunists, 
and the rising stars. First of all there are the 
old-established inhabitants. Lega Nord has a re-
silient network consisting of party websites and 
websites which have some connection with the 
Source: linkfluence
Netherlands
134 websites with anti-European content 
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
Partij voor de Vrijheid
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party. It is located on the bottom right edge 
of the chart and has a handful of links to like-
minded media and to Fratelli d’Italia, a very 
small conservative party with anti-European 
aspirations but without any internet momen-
tum. However, some of its members are rather 
active on Twitter. Giorgia Meloni has 130,000 
followers, and her party colleague Gianni Ale-
manno has 65,800. Both served as ministers 
in one of the Berlusconi governments. The 
party has many ideas in common with Lega 
Nord.  But it seems that Lega Nord’s time is 
past as well. During the Berlusconi years it 
came up with some very good election results 
(going by its standards), and now has a low 
(and stable) level of support. It is considered 
to be a party of simplistic slogans for simple 
minds. Lega Nord, which is opposed to mi-
gration and against integration, is a populist 
right-wing party of the old school. The op-
portunists are above them at the top on the 
right. Ever since it lost its majority and its 
leader and founding father, Forza Italia, Silvio 
Berlusconi’s party, has discovered that it can 
benefit from whipping up anti-European sen-
timents. Although for many years Forza Italia 
was the party of government, its network is 
remarkably isolated. It is true that FI politi-
cians Lara Comi and Deborah Bergamini are 
doing quite well on Twitter, and have 19,900 
and 10,900 followers, but when one compares 
this with the rising stars, Forza Italia cannot 
be taken seriously as a factor on the internet.
The rising stars are Beppe Grillo and  Movimento 
5 Stelle (M5S), which he founded. In the short 
time in which the movement has been in ex-
istence it has built up a very close-knit net-
work. It is based on the party website and 
on Beppe Grillo’s personal website. As in the 
case of the Dutch Party of Freedom, Grillo is 
of central importance and perhaps over-pow-
erful in this young protest movement. Grillo’s 
transformation from comedian to politician 
began with his stand against corruption, and 
his reputation grew rapidly at the height of 
the euro crisis. With the help of social net-
works in general and of Twitter in particular 
he started to surround himself with support-
ers. Grillo is the uncrowned king of the in-
ternet populists and has 1.44 million readers 
on Twitter. He disseminates a radical critique 
of the system. It is quite clear what he does 
not like: Rome, Berlin, and Brussels. However, 
what he likes continues to be rather nebu-
lous. The slogans which one hears again and 
Source: linkfluence
Italy 
184 websites with anti-European content 
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
Movimento 5 Stelle
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again are ecology, transparency, and direct 
democracy. Observers say that he behaves like 
“a leader of a sect.” “We are young,” his blog 
tells us. “We have no structure, hierarchy, lea- 
der or secretaries. We do not take orders from 
anyone.” At the same time Grillo has imposed 
a strict code of conduct on his MPs and ex-
pects unquestioning loyalty. Thus they are 
not allowed to talk to journalists, and in par-
ticular they are not permitted to appear in 
talk shows. Those who refuse to comply with 
these instructions get their marching orders 
and are expelled. Hitherto Grillo has not been 
a candidate for public office. However, in the 
Italian parliamentary elections in  February 
2013 his party came in second, and now 
has 109 of the 630 seats in the lower house. 
Grillo uses rather drastic language, and by 
and large he reaches people via the inter-
net. The movement’s websites, blogs such as 
grillivenezia.org/wordpress, Twitter and a You-
tube channel help him to evade the questions 
of the journalists. 100,137 people have sub-
scribed to the channel and regularly receive 
the messages of M5S. Our chart reveals the 
isolation of the M5S deputies. On the bottom 
left edge they inhabit their own universe, and 
there are no links to the “system.”
Poland – Learning from UKIP
All the anti-European parties in Poland come 
from the right of the political spectrum. The larg-
est network is that of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc 
(Law and Justice) Party (PiS).  In the period af-
ter 2000 the Kasczinsky twins were its leaders, 
and it controlled all the positions of power in 
Poland. Appropriately its network occupies a 
prominent position between the centre and the 
right on our populists’ chart. Not much higher 
is the very small network of Solidarna Polska of 
Jacek Kurski, who was once considered to be a 
PiS wunderkind. He fell into disfavour and then 
started out on his own. Since then he has found 
it rather difficult, both in elections and on the 
internet, to repeat his former triumphs. In the 
middle and above this is the only party which 
belongs to the left-wing spectrum. Samoobrona 
collapsed after the death of its founder. It now 
exists merely in legal and organizational terms. 
The most active network is on the left bottom 
edge of the chart, though this is not a sign that 
is left-wing. Nowa Prawica, or Congress of the 
New Right (CNR), is the surprise of this EP cam-
paign. The Congress of the New Right came 
into being in 2011 as a result of the amalga-
mation of two smaller parties masterminded 
Source: linkfluence
Poland
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by Janusz Korwin-Mikke. The party unites a 
number of different groups, and includes mon-
archists, libertarians and conservatives. Janusz 
Korwin-Mikke is a familiar figure in Polish poli-
tics, though hitherto the parties he has led have 
never managed to get over the five percent 
barrier. He has never managed to get a seat in 
parliament. However, on this occasion the fore-
casts say that he will get seven percent of the 
votes. And 22,900 Poles follow him on Twitter. 
The Nowa Prawica election manifesto contains 
a promise: “We are the only party that speaks 
out in a consistent and uncompromising way 
against the EU. We are fighting for a reduction 
of the EU until it becomes a free trade zone.” 
The manifesto also states that in the EP it will 
take its bearings from the British UKIP.
The CNR network may be small, but it is grow-
ing at a rapid rate, and it is in touch with other 
organizations. There are particularly close 
links with Ruch Narodowy, a far-right party 
whose ideology is based on concepts such 
as nation, tradition, family, sovereignty and 
splendid isolation.
However, such splendid isolation does not 
mean that the party is in favour of the abroga-
tion of the Schengen Agreement. None of the 
anti-European parties in Poland is opposed to 
Schengen. That is a unique feature of Polish 
politics, and here the large Law and Justice 
party is no exception. Currently it is slightly 
ahead of Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Citi-
zens’ Platform in the polls. That has often been 
the case in recent years. But Tusk  has always 
managed to come out on top. Jaroslaw Kasc-
zinsky is slowly but surely beginning to feel 
that it is time to score another success. There 
are already rumours about a power struggle 
behind the scenes.
Fragmented and isolated
When it comes to the European internet, the an-
ti-Europeans are both fragmented and isolated. 
The linguistic and ideological barriers seem to 
be greater than their common foe and bogey-
man. Despite all the announcements and the to-
ing and froing of their leaders in recent months, 
we have not been able to prove that there is 
any kind of connection between them, or that 
they have joined forces on the internet. The 
audience which the Le Pens, Wilders,  Farages 
and Grillos of this part of the world are trying 
to reach is that of the nation-state. This ties in 
with the results of the research undertaken by 
 Nathalie Brack and Olivier Costa “The Role(s) 
of the Eurosceptic MEPs” devoted to the parlia-
mentary work of their MEPs. They show that to 
all intents and purposes they were conspicuous 
by their absence and their political inactivity. 
As far as they are concerned, the European Un-
ion is no more than a means to an end, which is 
to come to power in the nation-states. As long 
as they cannot win a seat in the national in-
stitutions, they will make use of the European 
Parliament and the visibility and power which 
it gives to them in functional and structural 
terms for their own purposes, and not in order 
to do something for the electorate. With wry 
British humour Nigel Farage frequently points 
to this absurd aspect of the European political 
system. It is discreet enough to enable people 
to denounce it as opaque and undemocratic, 
but open enough to enable those who wish to 
abolish it to exploit its resources.
So how are the anti-European populists spread-
ing their views in the various societies? Sev-
eral patterns seem to be emerging. For ex-
ample, Marine Le Pen manages to project her 
anti-integration views deep into French public 
life, and yet she remains isolated in systemic 
terms. Other people are disseminating similar 
ideas, but they would never refer to her or to 
her party. One could in fact describe Marine Le 
Pen as a hidden opinion leader. A wave soars 
up in front of her, but it is repeatedly broken 
by others. Briton Nigel Farage rides the wave 
himself. No other anti-European populist has 
managed to set up such a tightly-knit network. 
No other country can rival Britain’s active anti-
European internet community. And as far as 
this civilian internet community is concerned, 
the points of reference are Nigel Farage and the 
UKIP. Important leading media are not afraid 
to mention him. In fact, they have turned him 
into the central representative of anti-Europe-
an sentiment. In Germany, on the other hand, 
a large bloc of pro-European parties and insti-
tutions is of central importance. The populist 
networks are weak and isolated. The AfD is 
14
sp
ot
lig
ht
 e
ur
op
e 
# 
20
14
 / 0
2 
  The 
Po
pu
lis
t N
et
w
or
ks
the only one which has managed to establish 
a relationship with the German online media. 
They amplify attitudes that are not in fact very 
popular. The Dutch Party of Freedom and the 
5 Star Movement in Italy function on the ba-
sis of personality cults. Their networks may 
actually be strong, but they are isolated. It is 
difficult to say what would become of them 
without  Wilders and Grillo. It remains to be 
seen whether the Polish election surprise is 
more than a flash in the pan. The party’s close 
connections with the far-right spectrum does 
not portend well for the future. Another bout 
of radicalization cannot be excluded.
The pro-Europeans’ most important task is to 
strengthen civil society on the internet. There 
is no dearth of ideas and initiatives. In the run-
up to the elections new websites are appearing 
on a daily basis. They are devoted to games, 
travel, diaries, monitors,  and films, and you 
can look at them, you can participate, you can 
pass them on to other people. On the whole it is 
young Europeans who want to support Europe, 
who switch on their computers and get down 
to it. But they often find it difficult to keep 
their heads above water. They do not necessar-
ily need money. What they need is recognition 
through networking. Every large government 
institution (be it national or European) and 
every party should create an email address for 
civil society projects and other initiatives that 
are interested in networking. A member of the 
publicity department should be given the task 
of checking the applications and creating ap-
propriate links. It is important to be generous 
and unbureaucratic. Thus it is standard prac-
tice to reject all responsibility for the content 
of linked websites by issuing a disclaimer. The 
question of how one deals with the legal risks 
of such links was resolved a long time ago. 
With few resources, low expenditure and little 
risk the large institutions can help  committed 
Europeans to stand up and be counted, and to 
go on to win the battle with the populists and 
their networks. 
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